Employing a new blockholder-firm panel data set in which we can track large shareholders across firms and over time, we find that firms' investment, financial, operational, and executive compensation policies vary with the particular blockholder present in a firm. The effects are strongest for activists, pension funds, and corporations, and weakest for banks, trusts, and money managers. We also find that large-shareholder fixed effects in corporate policies vary systematically with blockholder fixed effects in performance. Finally, we show that activists, pension funds, corporations, and private equity firms are more likely to influence firm policies, while mutual funds select firms based on their policies. The contribution of our paper is to show that heterogeneity in beliefs, skills, or risk preferences across large shareholders plays an important role for firms' policies and performance.
Introduction
Do large shareholders matter for corporate policies and firm performance? If so, do they all matter in a similar way, or do policies vary systematically across firms depending on who the particular large shareholder in a firm is? Several theoretical papers have modeled the monitoring role of large shareholders as a possible solution to agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in public corporations (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ), although other papers have argued that large shareholders sometimes lack incentives to monitor management (e.g., Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994) , and DeMarzo and Urošević (2006)). The empirical literature suggests that large shareholders matter with respect to some corporate policies, but overall, Holderness The contribution of our empirical study of large shareholders is to take the analysis to the smallest possible economic unit − the individual blockholder.
1 Our hypothesis is that large shareholders differ from each other along important dimensions such as their beliefs, skills, sophistication, or risk preferences. Different shareholders may, for example, have different beliefs about how to monitor management and what set of corporate policies will maximize expected returns. Such heterogeneity across major shareholders can play a key role for their behavior, and in turn, for the corporate policies of the firms in which they hold major stakes. Thus, the effect of one large shareholder on firm policies may be very different from 1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms "large shareholders" and "blockholders" interchangeably. In either case, we refer to entities that own more than 5% of a firm's outstanding shares, and thus have to be reported as "Principal Shareholders" in corporations' proxy statements. See Regulation and Schedule 14a (240.14a) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 for further details.
− even the opposite of − the effect of some other blockholder. Still, such heterogeneity across different blockholders has not been analyzed in previous research on large shareholders.
Our novel approach to studying large shareholders requires the construction of a blockholder-firm panel data set. We compile a new data set of large U.S. public corporations (essentially the S&P 1,500 set of firms) for which we can track, both over time and in the cross-section, all large shareholders. Applying a panel regression framework to this data set, we then estimate large-shareholder fixed effects in several strategic corporate variables related to investment policy (capital expenditures, investment to cash flow sensitivity, investment to Q sensitivity, and M&A policy), financial policy (leverage, dividend policy, and cash holdings), operational policy (cost cutting policy, R&D expenditures, and diversification policy), and executive compensation policies (CEO salary, total cash compensation, and total compensation). We also examine whether blockholder-specific effects are related to firm performance such as return on assets (ROA) and operating cash flow to total assets.
Our panel regression framework with year and firm fixed effects and time-varying firm-level characteristics to control for observable and unobservable differences across firms is similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) . They show that corporate policies vary systematically depending on who the CEOs, CFOs, and other executives of firms are, i.e., managers appear to impose their own individual "styles" on the companies that they run. The goal of this paper is to quantify large-shareholder fixed effects in corporate policy variables, not manager fixed effects.
2 2 Bertrand and Schoar (2003) identify manager fixed effects from variation in data generated by executives who move from one firm to another. We estimate large-shareholder fixed effects from blockholders moving in and out of a particular firm, but we are also able to identify the fixed effects from the cross-section of firms, because many large shareholders are present in multiple firms at a given point in time.
We report three main results. First, we find that firms' investment, financial, operational, and executive compensation policies vary with the particular large shareholder present in the firm. We then show that the economic magnitude of the effects is large: two large shareholders in the opposite tails of, say, the investments fixed effects distribution, are associated with very different investment policies. When we group blockholders into categories based on their affiliation, we find that the effects are strongest for activists, pension funds, corporations, and weakest for banks, trusts, and money managers.
Second, we find several systematic patterns in corporate policies that are related to the presence of large shareholders. Blockholders associated with more capital expenditures are also associated with significantly more M&A activity. Large shareholders associated with higher leverage are associated with lower cash holdings. Blockholders associated with more growth and fewer diversifying acquisitions are associated with higher CEO pay. Perhaps most importantly, we also find that large-shareholder fixed effects in corporate policies vary systematically with fixed effects in performance. Large shareholders associated with more aggressive investment policies, fewer diversifying acquisitions, more conservative financial policies, and higher CEO pay are also associated with increased operating profitability.
Finally, we attempt to address the question of causality. Large shareholders are not randomly assigned to firms, but choose the firms they invest in. The blockholder fixed effects we observe could be due to the direct or indirect influence on firm decisions by different large shareholders, i.e. causality runs from an investment by a large shareholder to changes in policies. The effects could alternatively reflect that a given blockholder systematically selects firms with specific policies, i.e. causality runs from changes in firm policies to an investment by a large shareholder. We examine the precise timing of policy changes, based on the hypothesis that policy changes due to influence should take place after the arrival of a blockholder, not in response to firms' policy changes. We show that our results are more consistent with influence for activists, pension funds, corporations, and private equity firms, and are more in line with selection for mutual funds.
Our paper adds to an existing empirical literature on large shareholders. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) show that corporate policies are different when a firm has a majority shareholder. Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998) find that activists affect M&A activity and operating profitability. 3 Allen and Phillips (2000) show that corporate blockholders impact investments and ROA. Qiu (2006) finds that public pension funds reduce the acquisition frequency by cash-rich and low-q firms ("buying-growth" acquisitions), while the opposite is the case for mutual funds. We add to this literature by examining a large sample of firms, many categories of large shareholders, and a broad range of corporate policies. Most importantly, we emphasize that heterogeneity in beliefs, skill, or risk preferences across large shareholders, even within a narrow blockholder category, plays a role for their impact on firm policies. We are aware of only one study which addresses heterogeneity across major shareholders. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) study the effects of shareholder proposals by large pension funds, and find that funds with different investment objectives pursue different proposals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why large-shareholder heterogeneity may matter for corporate policies. Section 3 describes the construction of our new blockholder-firm panel data set, and reports summary statistics. Section 4 describes our empirical methodology. Section 5 reports our results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes and suggests some directions for future research.
Blockholder heterogeneity and firm policies
In standard neoclassical models, one shareholder, whether large or small, is no different from any other shareholder. Two firms that have similar factor inputs, production technologies, and that face comparable market conditions, will choose the same set of corporate policies and will show similar economic performance, whether or not any large shareholder is present in the firm. Under this view, blockholders do not matter for corporate policies.
In contrast, a large body of agency models argues that large shareholders may matter for firms' decisions. One of the first theory papers on the monitoring role of large shareholders is Shleifer and Vishny (1986) . They provide a model showing that as the ownership stake becomes larger, a blockholder has a greater incentive to affect policies to increase firm value. 4 Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) , Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) , Kahn and Winton (1998) , Maug (1998) , and others also model large shareholders' monitoring role, but argue that market liquidity or risk aversion may reduce large shareholders' incentives to monitor management. Large shareholders may also use their stakes to change firm policies to enjoy private benefits of control.
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However, standard agency models do not predict that corporate policies will vary systematically with the particular large shareholder present in a firm because these models do 4 Empirical evidence of such increases in firm value comes from several papers. For example, there is evidence that formation of blocks and the trading of large blocks are associated with abnormal positive stock returns (see, e.g., Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) and Barclay and Holderness (1991) ). 5 Barclay and Holderness (1989) There are two possible explanations for blockholder fixed effects in corporate policies.
The first one suggests that a large shareholder influences policies in the same way across all firms in which he holds a stake. Shareholders can do so directly by electing directors, voting on changes to the corporate structure or charter, or through proxy contests and shareholder proposals. Large shareholders can also influence policies indirectly through informal negotiations with incumbent management and through media.
7 Indirect influence appears to be important. A clinical study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, a shareholder engagement fund, shows that the nature of a lot of influence is informal (see Becht, et al. (2006) ).
6 As a result, many empirical papers include as an explanatory variable a dummy that is one if there is any large shareholder present at all, or the size of the blockholder's percentage ownership stake. A recent example is Cremers and Nair (2005) , who run regressions of various firm performance measures, such as industry-adjusted return on assets, on the percentage of stocks held by all institutional blockholders. Other studies have run similar types of regressions for corporate policies such as executive compensation and operating expenses (see, e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) ). 7 We recognize at least two caveats regarding large shareholders' influence. First, because shareholder proposals cannot relate to the day-to-day operation of firms, some legal scholars have argued that there are significant constraints on large shareholders' direct influence (e.g., Black (1990) 
Data

Construction of the blockholder-firm panel data set
Our approach to analyzing large shareholders requires a panel data set that allows us to track blockholders, both over time in a given firm and also across firms at any given point in time. Such a data set cannot be obtained from a standard database, e.g., Compact
Disclosure. We therefore construct our blockholder-firm panel data set by hand. Specifically, we start with the 1996-2001 unbalanced panel of large public corporations in the U.S. and their blockholders, collected by Dlugosz, et al. (2006) . This set of firms is essentially the S&P 1,500, excluding dual-class share firms. Their data on blockholders (i.e., 5% shareholders) were hand-collected from firms' proxy statements. 8 We exclude financial firms and utilities from our analysis. 10 There are at least two reasons why we may underestimate the number and importance of major shareholders. First, some shareholders may select to hold just below 5% in order to avoid reporting responsibilities, or because insider status might reduce the liquidity of their blockholdings. Second, some large shareholders may move in and out of a firm within one calendar year, and because our data comes from annual proxy statements, we may underestimate the number of blockholders, in particular among types of blockholders with a high trading frequency (e.g., mutual funds). 11 Our activist classification is consistent with the one used by Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998 supermarkets, food and drug combination stores, and discount food stores in the U.S.
We see that financial blockholders -mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, and money managers -are present in a large number of different firms because they tend to hold large diversified portfolios, and possibly also because they move in and out of firms more often than do other large shareholders. For example, a mutual fund blockholder is present, on average, in about 32 different firms. Private equity firms, i.e., leverage buy-out 
Data on corporate policies and firm performance
For each firm-year, we obtain data on corporate policies and firm performance from three data sources. From Compustat, we obtain annual accounting variables. 13 From SDC's 12 To improve the effects of activism and influence, some LBO firms take firms private. This introduces a sample selection bias since we only analyze public corporations. However, such a bias is likely to work against us finding any effect on corporate policies for this category of large shareholders. 13 We winsorize all accounting variables at the 1% level.
Mergers and Acquisitions database (by Thomson Financial), we obtain data on the number of M&A transactions and the number of diversifying acquisitions. From S&P's Execucomp database, we obtain CEO compensation, such as base salary, bonus, and the value of granted stock options. Variable definitions are reported in the Appendix. Table 2 presents means, medians and standard deviations for the corporate variables that we study. The first three columns present summary statistics for our blockholder-firm panel data set. As a comparison, the last three columns report statistics for the full Compustat data set during the same time period. The firms in our data set tend to be larger and more profitable, have higher cash flows, dividend/earnings ratios, and leverage than the average
Compustat firm, and they invest less in capital expenditures and R&D, as we would expect from the universe of S&P 1,500 firms.
Empirical methodology
Our main empirical goal is to estimate blockholder-specific effects for a broad range of important corporate policy measures. We therefore estimate the following regression model for each policy variable of interest:
where i indexes firms and t indexes years. it y is one of the firm policy measures, t λ are year fixed effects, i δ are firm fixed effects, it X is a vector of time-varying firm-level control variables, it Z is a 1 J × vector of blockholder dummies for firm i in year t, and it ε is an error term. This specification fully controls for fixed differences between firms (which also absorb industry differences), while the year dummies control for aggregate fluctuations in corporate practices over time. Γ , the focus of our study, is a 1 J × vector of blockholder fixed effects,
where J is the total number of blockholders in our sample.
The panel regression framework described above can most easily be understood through the example given in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) . Consider, for example, the firm's capital expenditures to lagged net property, plant, and equipment, our measure of investment policy. We first estimate residual investment ratios at the firm-year level after controlling for average differences across years and firms as well as any firm-year specific shocks, such as a change in growth opportunities (measured by changes in Q), which may also affect the investment policy of a company. We then estimate how much of the variation in the remaining residual investment ratios can be attributed to large-shareholder fixed effects.
While the empirical model in equation (1) allows for heterogeneity across blockholders, it assumes that each large shareholder influences or selects all its holdings in a similar way. Therefore, if a blockholder is associated with higher capital expenditures in one of its holdings and lower in another, by imposing a structure of one effect per blockholder, we will only be able to estimate the average effect associated with the blockholder. Also, there is sometimes more than one large shareholder present at the same time in a firm. Our structure does not account for interaction effects that may arise in such situations.
It is not feasible for us to estimate the fixed effect for a blockholder who is present in only one firm throughout the entire sample period, because the effect of this particular blockholder on corporate policies cannot be identified separately from the firm fixed effect.
Consider for example the California Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers). Calpers holds a block in Catellus Development Corporation, during the entire time period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] in which Catellus is in our sample. Calpers is not a blockholder in any other firm in our sample. In this case, we cannot statistically separate the blockholder fixed effect of Calpers from the firm fixed effect of Catellus.
It is feasible for us to estimate the blockholder fixed effect for a blockholder that is present in a particular firm during a subperiod of the entire time period. We recognize however that the fixed effects for such blockholders may simply correspond to firm-periodspecific effects, and that it is difficult to rule out that we incorrectly attribute firm-periodspecific effects to a blockholder instead of other unobservable time-varying firm-level characteristics. We therefore require that a blockholder be present in multiple firms when estimating equation (1). 14 Thus, firm policies have to be positively correlated across multiple firms for us to find any significant blockholder fixed effects.
Results
Evidence on large shareholder categories and corporate policies
Before we estimate large-shareholder fixed effects in corporate policies, we explore our data set to see whether a separation of all large shareholders into the 13 categories in Panel A of Table 1 accounts for the heterogeneity across blockholders. We construct 13 dummy variables for the categories of blockholders and estimate standard pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions for four important policies. Table 3 reports results from regressing investments, leverage, SG&A expenses, and total CEO compensation (columns 1-4, respectively) on the 13 blockholder category dummy variables, as well as time-varying firmlevel controls and year and industry fixed effects. 15 We see that no more than four of the categories are statistically significant at the 10% level for any of the policy variables, which is consistent with the lack of significance of previous studies as summarized by Holderness (2003) 16 There are two interpretations of the result. First, it is possible that there is no systematic association of large shareholders and corporate policies. Second, heterogeneity across large shareholders may matter for corporate policies, but when the effects are aggregated and averaged within a blockholder category, the effects cancel each other. In the rest of the paper, we therefore use our panel regression framework and blockholder-firm panel data set to provide evidence on which interpretation is true. The first variable we analyze in Panel A, investments, is defined as capital expenditures as a proportion of lagged net property, plant, and equipment. The benchmark regression includes year and firm fixed effects, lagged Q, lagged cash flow, and the lagged logarithm of total assets. Although the fit of the benchmark regression is already high (59%), we see that the adjusted R 2 increases by more than two percentage points as we add largeshareholder fixed effects. More importantly, the F-statistic is large and statistically significant (p-value < 0.0001), allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of no blockholder-specific effects in capital expenditures. That is, investment policy varies systematically across firms depending on who the particular large shareholder in a firm is.
Evidence on large-shareholder fixed effects and corporate policies
Next, we turn to two other aspects of investment policy: investment to cash flow and investment to Q sensitivities. The estimation procedure here is somewhat different from the one outlined in the previous section. Here, the fixed effect of interest is not related to the level of investment per se, but rather to the sensitivity of investment to cash flow and Q, respectively. Therefore, the benchmark regression for investment to cash flow sensitivity involves regressing investment on year and firm fixed effects, lagged cash flow, lagged Q, lagged logarithm of total assets, and firm fixed effects interacted with lagged cash flow. We then add blockholder fixed effects, and blockholder fixed effects interacted with lagged cash flow. The estimated coefficients of interest are those on the latter interaction terms. We use a similar procedure when we examine investment to Q sensitivity. We find substantial increases in adjusted R 2 . Also, the significant F-statistics show that there are important blockholder-specific effects in both measures of investment sensitivity. Panel C presents our results regarding firms' operational policies. The benchmark regression includes year and firm fixed effects, lagged cash flow, lagged logarithm of total assets, and ROA. The first variable we consider is the ratio of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses to total sales. We see that the fit improves, and the Fstatistic is significant, when we include large-shareholder fixed effects. We find similar evidence for R&D policy. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no blockholderspecific effects in firms' diversification policy.
Finally, in Panel D we turn to executive compensation policy. Each of the benchmark regressions includes year and firm fixed effects, lagged logarithm of total assets, and lagged Q. From the F-statistics, we reject the null hypothesis of no blockholder-specific effects in CEO salary, total cash compensation, as well as total compensation (which includes stock and 17 Given the short time period available for our analysis, and given the infrequency of major corporate divestitures (e.g., spinoffs, equity carve-outs, and selloffs), we do not study divestitures. 18 Our finding of a significant association between large shareholders and dividends is consistent with Pérez-González (2003) who shows that dividend ratios are affected by a firm's large shareholder's tax status.
options grants). That is, CEO pay varies systematically across firms depending on who the particular large shareholder in a firm is. 
Blockholder fixed effects for different categories of large shareholders
Next, we examine whether some categories of large shareholders are associated with more significant fixed effects than others. For activists and pension funds we find significant blockholder fixed effects in investment, financial, and executive compensation policies, but not in operational policies. In contrast, for corporations, we find significant effects in operational policies like R&D policy and in financial policies, e.g., debt ratios, possibly reflecting the fact that many of the corporate blockholdings are due to customer-supplier and other product market relationships (e.g., Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) ).
We also find some significant F-statistics for financial blockholders. For LBO firms, we find significant blockholder fixed effects for leverage; for VC firms we find significant effects for R&D policy. For mutual funds, we find significant effects for investment and financial policies. For hedge funds, insurance companies, and money managers, we find significant effects for some of the same variables, but we see that the effects are weaker.
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In contrast, for banks, trusts, and universities, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no blockholder fixed effects. 21 The insignificant F-statistics are important because these categories of blockholders represent a considerable fraction of all large shareholders, and they are often included in the right-hand-side governance control variable "outside blockholder" in attempts to control for the potential monitoring by large outside shareholders. Still, we find no evidence that these blockholders play any role for firm policies once we control for timevarying firm-specific characteristics as well as firm fixed effects.
Economic magnitude of large-shareholder fixed effects in corporate policies
In this section, we quantify the economic magnitude of the heterogeneity across large shareholders. In particular, we examine each of the distributions of large-shareholder fixed effects that we obtain in Table 4 . Consider for example capital expenditures: by examining the blockholder fixed effects distribution for firms' investment ratios, we can quantify how much additional capital expenditures are associated with a blockholder in the upper tail of the distribution (75th percentile) compared to one in the lower tail (25th percentile) of the same 20 Note that our sample period ends in 2001. Thus, our analysis predates the more recent speculation that hedge fund are becoming more and more active (e.g., Klein and Zur (2006) ). 21 Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) investigate how business ties affect proxy voting by analyzing institutional investors' aggregate votes on management-initiated proposals for anti-takeover provisions. They find that banks and trusts, which frequently derive benefits from lines of business under management control, are less likely to be active and oppose management.
distribution. In columns (3)-(6) of Table 6 , we report the median, standard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles for the distributions of blockholder fixed effects. In order to account for estimation error, we compute these statistics weighting each blockholder fixed effect by the inverse of its standard error.
Overall, the size of the blockholder fixed effects is economically large. For example, we see that the difference between a large shareholder at the 25th percentile of the capital expenditures fixed effects distribution and one at the 75th percentile is 0.15. This can be compared to the mean investment ratio of 0.28 in our overall sample.
For leverage, we have an average debt ratio of 0.37 in our sample. The table shows that a blockholder in the bottom quartile is associated with 0.05 lower leverage, while one in the top quartile is associated with 0.06 higher leverage. Thus, a blockholder at the 25th percentile is associated with about 14% (= 0.05/0.37) less debt in the capital structure, all else equal.
The blockholder fixed effects for operational variables are also large. For example, the difference between a blockholder in the lower tail of the distribution of SG&A expenditures and one in the upper tail is about 0.08. This is economically large as the mean SG&A ratio in our overall sample is 0.21.
Finally, we observe a substantial difference between the upper and lower tails of the distribution of salary and total compensation. The estimates are most easily interpreted in dollar terms. In our sample, the average total CEO compensation is $5.4 million. We find that a blockholder in the upper tail is associated with $1.4 million higher total executive compensation per year (26% above the mean), all else equal.
One concern regarding our results is that the true blockholder fixed effects are zero, but that the estimated fixed effects are distributed randomly around zero just because of estimation error. A rejection of the null hypothesis of no blockholder fixed effects in Table 4 might then simply be due to a few effects that are estimated with particularly large errors.
Columns (7)- (10) of Table 6 address this concern. In particular, columns (7)-(9) report standard deviations, 25th percentiles, and 75th percentiles for distributions generated by a simulation procedure in which we re-assign all blockholders to random firm-years and then re-estimate the blockholder fixed effects. We repeat this procedure 100 times, which generates a simulated distribution. Column (10) then performs two-sample KolmogorovSmirnov (KS) tests for the equality of the actual blockholder fixed effects distribution and the simulated distribution.
We find that the actual distributions are very different from the bootstrap distributions.
For most of the corporate policies, the standard deviation and the interquartile difference of the actual fixed effects is much larger than for the simulated distributions. Consider for example capital expenditures. While the actual standard deviation (interquartile difference) is 0.19 (0.15), the one for the simulated distribution is only 0.08 (0.06). The KS test statistic of 0.1134 rejects the equality of distributions at all levels (p-value = 0.001). The evidence for the other corporate policies is similar. The KS tests reject the null hypothesis of equality of distribution functions at least at the 10% level for all of the corporate policies except for diversification policy. Thus, the blockholder fixed effects that we have estimated do not seem to be merely a reflection of estimation error.
Large shareholders and patterns in corporate policies
Our panel regression framework and blockholder-firm panel data set provide an opportunity to examine whether systematic patterns in corporate policies are related to the presence of large shareholders. We can analyze such patterns by studying the correlation structure between the large-shareholder fixed effects that we obtain in Table 4 . We start by compiling a new cross-sectional data set that contains, for each blockholder and corporate policy, the estimated fixed effect. We then estimate the following regression model: (2) is an estimated coefficient. This induces an attenuation bias in the estimation of β . We therefore weigh each blockholder fixed effect by the inverse of its standard error to account for estimation error. Table 7 reports evidence on large shareholders and patterns in corporate policies.
Each number in this table corresponds to a separate regression. Examining patterns in investment policy, we see that large shareholders who are associated with more capital expenditures are also associated with more M&A activity. This pattern suggest that some large shareholders play an important role for growth strategies, while other blockholders prefer the status quo.
Another important finding is that firms with blockholders who are associated with growth also appear to be more investment to Q sensitive, but less investment to cash flow sensitive. This evidence is important as there is ongoing debate as to what causes the variation in investment sensitivity across firms (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (2000) ). Our results add to these previous findings by showing that large shareholders are related to investment sensitivities.
Turning to patterns in financial policies, we find a significant negative correlation between large-shareholder fixed effects for leverage and cash holdings. That is, some blockholders are associated with more debt and at the same time less cash, i.e., less financial slack. These patterns suggest that there are different types of large shareholders: those that are financially aggressive and those that are more conservative.
Finally, we study executive compensation patterns. Firms with large shareholders that are associated with more growth, fewer diversifying acquisitions, more Q sensitivity, and less cash flow sensitivity, are also associated with more CEO pay. This evidence suggests that large shareholders may play a role in the design of executive compensation schemes. It adds to the findings by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) . Bertrand and Mullainathan show that firms with better governance and large shareholders pay their CEOs less for luck, and Hartzell and Starks show that firms with more institutional ownership concentration pay their CEOs less and pay a higher fraction of salary in equity.
Large shareholders and firm performance
Given the evidence of large-shareholder fixed effects in corporate policies, a natural question is: to what extent does blockholder heterogeneity explain the variation in economic performance across firms? A few previous studies examine the relation between large outside shareholders and firm performance and valuation. 22 McConnell and Servaes (1990) find no significant relation between Q and the presence of an outside blockholder. Mehran (1995) 22 There is also a considerable body of research on whether concentrated inside ownership affects firm performance and valuations (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , McConnell and Servaes (1990) , and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) ). In this paper, we study large outside shareholders.
finds no significant relation between firm performance (Q and ROA) and outside directors' stock holdings. Our approach is different from prior research. We use the panel regression framework to study whether performance varies systematically across firms depending on who the particular blockholder in a firm is, taking blockholder heterogeneity into account.
Note that we identify blockholder fixed effects in performance through at least two different firms, so the observation of Zhou (2001) about slowly changing ownership and the problem of identification is not of concern for our approach.
In Table 8 , we report results for two measures of firm performance: ROA, defined as the ratio of EBITDA over lagged total assets, and operating ROA, i.e., operating cash flow over lagged total assets. The evidence is similar for both measures. In Panel A, our benchmark regressions include controls for year and firm fixed effects, and lagged logarithm of total assets. The adjusted R 2 increases by more than 3% when we add fixed effects for large shareholders and the F-statistics are large and statistically significant. Panel B shows that a blockholder at the lower tail of the ROA fixed effects distribution is associated with 3 percentage points lower returns, while a blockholder at the upper tail is associated with 3 percentage points higher returns, all else equal. Since the average ROA in our sample is around 5%, the economic magnitude of the performance fixed effect is economically large.
As noted above, previous studies have not found much support for a relation between large shareholders and firm performance. In contrast, we show that some blockholders are systematically associated with higher performance and other blockholders are associated with lower performance. Thus, heterogeneity across large shareholders appears to matter for firm performance, but when the effects are aggregated and averaged, the effects cancel each other.
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In Table 9 , we report evidence on patterns between corporate policy variables and firm performance that are related to the presence of large shareholders. Operating performance is significantly higher in companies with large shareholders associated with more capital expenditures and more M&A activity. Return on assets is also higher in firms with blockholders associated with lower investment to cash flow sensitivity and higher investment to Q sensitivity. We also find that ROA is lower in firms with blockholders who are associated with diversifying acquisitions. Finally, we find that firm performance is higher in companies with blockholders associated with higher CEO pay.
Causality
The results presented so far are consistent with direct or indirect influence of large shareholders on corporate policies and firm performance. An alternative explanation that is also consistent with our findings does not involve influence. Suppose large shareholders have no ability or desire to affect firm policies. Rather, they observe policy changes, and then they select to invest large stakes in precisely those companies which have begun to change the specific policies that they care about. In this case, the large-shareholder fixed effects we have estimated are a reflection of a systematic selection of firms by each large shareholder.
Since we do not have a random assignment of large shareholders to firms, our data set does not allow us to completely distinguish between these two explanations. Therefore, our goal must be more modest in that we simply want to present some preliminary evidence on the direction of causality. We do so by analyzing the precise timing of the observed changes in corporate policies. Under the influence explanation, the policy changes will take place after a large shareholder invests in a firm. In contrast, under the selection interpretation, we would expect at least some of the changes in firm policies to start taking place before the arrival of the blockholder, as the large shareholders respond to observed policy changes. That is, we would not expect an exact overlap between policy changes and the investment by a particular blockholder.
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To study the direction of causality, we randomly allocate each blockholder's stakes into two disjoint subsets. For the first subset, we estimate the blockholder fixed effects as before. We call these estimates "post-investment blockholder fixed effects." For the second subset, we estimate large-shareholder fixed effects assuming that each blockholder has a stake in the firm one or two years (depending on data availability) before its actual arrival. We call these estimates "pre-investment blockholder fixed effects." We then regress them on the actual, post-investment, fixed effects. Under the selection explanation, we would expect to find a statistically significant correlation between the two effects because at least some of the changes in firm policies start to take place before the arrival of the large shareholder. While we do not want to interpret these results too aggressively due to the small sample sizes and the short time series available for our analysis, they appear to suggest that causality interpretations differ by blockholder categories.
For activists, pension funds, corporations, and private equity firms, many of the policy changes seem to take place after such a large shareholder's arrival. This result is more consistent with an influence interpretation of blockholder fixed effects in corporate policies and firm performance, i.e. causality runs from blockholders to firm policies. In contrast, the results for mutual funds seem more consistent with a selection explanation, i.e. causality runs from firm policy to an investment by these blockholders. 25 Our results on mutual funds are consistent with the recent evidence that some institutional investors appear to prefer certain stock characteristics (e.g., Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Gompers and Metrick (2001)) and suggest that the list of desired characteristics not only includes size, share price, or liquidity, but also more detailed corporate policy variables.
Conclusions
In this paper, we find statistically significant and economically large heterogeneity across large shareholders. Investment, financial, and operational policies, and CEO pay vary across firms depending on the particular large shareholder present in a firm. These effects are strongest for activists, pension funds, corporations, and private equity firms, and weakest for banks, trusts, and money managers. We also find that the large-shareholder fixed effects in policies correlate systematically with performance fixed effects. Finally, we show that our 25 One conflict of interest explanation for why mutual funds may not want to influence corporate policies is provided by Kim and Davis (2006) . They show that the magnitude of mutual funds' business ties with their portfolio firms is related to funds' proxy votes at specific firms and to overall voting practices.
findings are more consistent with influence for activists, pension funds, corporations, and private equity firms, but more consistent with selection for mutual funds.
Several questions are left for future work on large shareholders. First, while we offer some preliminary evidence on causality, our data set does not allow us to completely distinguish between an influence and a selection explanation. Future research might shed more light on these different interpretations. Second, our evidence raises questions about where blockholder heterogeneity actually comes from. Do our results reflect differences in how to monitor management and in what constitutes "good policies" that maximize expected returns? Or do they reflect heterogeneity in skills or perhaps risk preferences? Finally, our panel regression framework with blockholder fixed effects can be replicated on blockholderfirm panel data set from other institutional settings that the U.S. The legal protection of investors varies a lot across countries (La Porta, et al. (1998) ). Thus, may blockholder heterogeneity matter more in countries with weaker governance?
Appendix: Variable definitions
The corporate variables used in this paper are defined as follows:
• Cash flow is defined as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) and depreciation (Compustat item 14) divided by lagged net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 8).
• Cash holdings is defined as cash and short-term investments (Compustat item 1) over lagged net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 8).
• Dividends/earnings is the ratio of the sum of common dividends (Compustat item 21) and preferred dividends (Compustat item 19) over earnings before depreciation, interest, and tax (Compustat item 13).
• Investment is capital expenditures (Compustat item 128) over lagged net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 8).
• Leverage is long-term debt (Compustat item 9) plus current liabilities (Compustat item 34) divided by long-term debt plus current liabilities plus book value of common equity (Compustat item 60).
• N of acquisitions is the total number of acquisitions in the fiscal year.
• N of diversifying acquisitions is the number of acquisitions per fiscal year in industries other than the one of the acquirer. Industry affiliation is measured by the FamaFrench 48 industry classification.
• Operating return on assets is the ratio of operating cash flow (Compustat item 308) over lagged total assets (Compustat item 6).
• Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (Compustat item 6). The market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity (calendar year close (Compustat item 25) times shares outstanding (Compustat item 199)) less the sum of the book value of common equity (Compustat item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item 74).
• R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures (Compustat item 46) over lagged total assets (Compustat item 6).
• Return on assets is the ratio of EBITDA (Compustat item 18) over lagged total assets (Compustat item 6).
• Salary is defined as the cash salary to the CEO for a fiscal year (Execucomp item salary).
Table 1 Summary statistics of large shareholders
The sample is the panel data set described in section 3. Panel A classifies large shareholders into 13 categories based on their investment activities, and reports summary statistics for each type. Activists are those who announce their intention of influencing firm policies at the time of the block purchase or who are known for activist policies in the past. Corporations are industrial corporations. Money managers provide investment advice/services to high net worth individuals, foundations, endowments, but do not sell open-end funds to the public. Trusts are those trusts that cannot be attributed to an individual blockholder. Because much of the analysis requires that a large shareholder be present in at least two different firms, Panel B presents summary statistics for the resulting subset. Panel C reports summary statistics on the number of large shareholders per firm-year. (1)), the fixed effects included in row (1) are year and firm fixed effects, in row (2) are year and firm fixed effects, as well as fixed effects for blockholders present in multiple firms. In the "Investment to cash flow" and "Investment to Q" regressions, we also include interactions of the firm and blockholder fixed effects with cash flows and lagged Q, respectively. Also included in the "Investment," "Investment to cash flow" and "Investment to Q" regressions are lagged logarithm of total assets, lagged Q, and lagged cash flow. The "Number of acquisitions" regressions include lagged logarithm of total assets and return on assets. Each regression in Panel B includes the lagged logarithm of total assets, lagged cash flow, and return on assets. Each regression in Panel C also includes the lagged logarithm of total assets, lagged cash flow, and return on assets. In the "N of diversifying acquisitions" regression we also include a dummy variable for whether the firm undertook any acquisition at all in that year. Each regression in Panel D includes the lagged logarithm of total assets and lagged Q. Reported are F-tests for the joint significance of the blockholder fixed effects (column (2)). For each F-test we report the value of the F-statistic, and within parentheses, the p-value and the number of constraints that are being tested. For the "Investment to cash flow" and "Investment to Q" regressions, the F-tests are for the joint significance of the interaction between the blockholder fixed effects and cash flow and Q, respectively. Column (3) reports the number of firm-year observations, and column (4) reports the adjusted R 2 s for each regression. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample is the panel data set described in section 3. Definitions of the variables are available in the Appendix. The table reports the results from the same fixed effects panel regressions as in Table 4 . Reported are F-tests for the joint significance of the blockholder fixed effects by blockholder categories. For each F-test we report the value of the F-statistic and the p-value in parentheses. For the "Investment to cash flow" and "Investment to Q" regressions, the F-tests are for the joint significance of the interaction between the blockholder fixed effects and cash flow and Q, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample is the panel data set described in section 3. Definitions of the variables are available in the Appendix. The table reports the distributions of the large-shareholder fixed effects estimated in Table 4 . Columns (2)-(6) report statistics for the actual blockholder fixed effects distributions. Column (2) reports the number of blockholders. Column (3) reports the median blockholder fixed effect for each corporate policy variable. Column (4) reports the standard deviation of the blockholder fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) report the blockholder fixed effects at the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of the actual distribution, respectively. Columns (7)-(9) report simulated standard deviations, 25th percentiles, and 75th percentiles for distributions generated by assigning the blockholders to random firm-years and re-estimating blockholder fixed effects. We repeat this procedure 100 times. Column (10) performs two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution functions. p-values are reported within parentheses. Each fixed effect is weighted by the inverse of its standard error to account for estimation error. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample is the panel data set described in section 3. Definitions of the variables are available in the Appendix. Each number in this table corresponds to a separate regression. Each number reports the coefficient from a regression of the blockholder fixed effects from the row variable on the blockholder fixed effects from the column variable. Observations in the regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the explanatory variable to account for estimation error. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample is the panel data set described in section 3. Definitions of the variables are available in the Appendix. Panel A reports the results from fixed effects panel regressions. For each dependent variable (in column (1)), the fixed effects included in row (1) are year and firm fixed effects, in row (2) are year and firm fixed effects, as well as fixed effects for blockholders present in multiple firms. Each regression also includes the lagged logarithm of total assets. Reported are F-tests for the joint significance of the blockholder fixed effects (column (2)). For each F-test we report the value of the F-statistic, and within parentheses, the p-value and the number of constraints that are being tested. Column (3) reports the number of firm-year observations, and column (4) the adjusted R 2 s for each regression. The fixed effects used in Panel B are from the regressions reported in Panel A. Column (1) reports the number of observations. Column (2) reports the median blockholder fixed effect for each firm performance variable. Column (3) reports the standard deviation of the fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5) report the fixed effects at the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of the distribution, respectively. Each fixed effect is weighted by the inverse of its standard error to account for estimation error. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample is the panel data set described in section 3. Definitions of the variables are available in the Appendix. Each number in this table corresponds to a separate regression. Each number reports the coefficient from a regression of the blockholder fixed effects from the row variable on the blockholder fixed effects from the column variable. Observations in the regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the explanatory variable to account for estimation error. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Investment
Return on assets
Operating return on assets The sample is the panel data set described in section 3. Definitions of the variables are available in the Appendix. Each entry in this table corresponds to a different regression. Reported in the table are estimates from regressing "pre-entry blockholder fixed effects" (from a period prior to the blockholder's investment) on the actual blockholder fixed effects. Observations in the regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the explanatory variable to account for estimation error. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
